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Mind and Measurement
Review by John H. Flowers
Daniel Algom (ed.), Psychophysical Approaches to Cognition
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992. 627 pp. ISBN 0-444-88978-7. $157.00 (df. 275,-)
Daniel Algom, professor of psychology at Bar-Ilan University (Ramat-Gan Israel), is recipient of a grant from
the United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (1990-1993) and from the Israel National Academy of
Science (1993-1996). Algom is author of Perception and Psychophysics: An Historically Oriented Introduction to
Some Representative Problems and Issues in the History of Psychology (both in Hebrew).
John H. Flowers, professor of psychology at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, is author, with C. Gargin, of
the chapter “Creativity and Perception” in J. A. Glover, R. R. Ronning, and C. R. Reynolds (eds.) Handbook of
Creativity: Assessment, Research, and Theory, author of the chapter “Voluntary and Involuntary Shifts of Spatial
Attention During Visual Search” in D. Brogan and K. Caw (Eds.) Visual Search 2, and editor of Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Cognitive Processes (Vol. 28).
A salient theme that emerges from
almost any academic review of the history of psychological science is the tendency for certain research traditions
and paradigms to develop independently, with relatively little crosstalk.
Such has been the case with the classical psychophysical tradition and the
much younger subdiscipline of laboratory cognitive psychology. The present
edited volume (part of the “Advances
in Psychology” series from North-Holland) contains 10 chapters, each of
which addresses some aspect of the
historical, existing, or future potential
relationships between psychophysics and cognition. Given the diversity of research and theoretical interests among the 12 contributors to this
volume, it is not surprising that the
chapters differ in the relative emphasis they place on historical and philosophical analysis, advancement of theory, and review of empirical research.
However, it is clear from the editor’s
remarks in the Preface that these chapters were indeed intended as “self-contained” (p. v) units, albeit within the
broad theme of integrating psychophysical theories and methods within
the domain of cognition.
Although the volume title implies
that the primary theme will be to examine applications of psychophysical

techniques to the study of cognition,
the first three chapters are somewhat
more concerned. with the cognitive nature of psychophysical judgment itself.
Anderson’s chapter, titled “Integration Psychophysics and Cognition,” is
aimed at advancing both a theoretical
perspective and methodological approach—information integration theory and functional measurement. This
comprehensive, eight-section chapter provides a sufficiently detailed development of both theory and methods that readers not previously
familiar with Anderson’s perspective and approach will find informative and thought provoking. Anderson
provides clear descriptions of empirical applications involving a diverse
set of research problems and settings,
ranging from sensory evaluation (e.g.,
brightness judgment) to the more cognitive topics of memory psychophysics
and attributions of causality. Because a
major function of a volume such as this
should be to stimulate creative thinking within a subject area, it is very useful to present examples of limitations
of an approach and to discuss unresolved problems. This chapter accomplishes both these goals as well.
Marks’s chapter, titled “ ‘What Thin
Partitions Sense From Thought Divide’:
Toward a New Cognitive Psychophys368

ics,” is even more directly aimed at
cognitive influences on psychophysics
per se than is Anderson’s chapter. After
tracing the roots of modern thinking
about perception and psychophysical
measurement from ancient Greek philosophy to the present, Marks presents
an excellent overview of research on
context effects in psychophysical judgment, concluding with a strong plea
for a pluralistic and cognitively based
approach to psychophysics.
Ward’s chapter, titled “Mind in
Psychophysics,” continues the theme
that psychophysical judgment is best
viewed in a pluralistic, cognitive
framework. However, the theme is developed largely through a critical analysis of modern multidisciplinary views
of the role of the mind (e.g., Minsky,
Bechtel, and Dennett, to name a few),
rather than from issues presented from
empirical data. As such, Ward’s chapter nicely complements the previous
chapter by Marks. As with Marks’s
chapter, however, Ward’s chapter is
more concerned with the cognitive nature of psychophysics than with the
application of psychophysical theory
or procedures to the assessment of cognitive structure or representation.
With the exception of the final
chapter, which returns to issues concerning sensory evaluation, the re-
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maining chapters each address a
theme that links a psychophysical approach with the study of cognitive
representations. Galanter’s contribution, “Intentionalism—An Expressive
Theory,” is concerned with psychophysical analysis of choice behavior.
This chapter develops and provides
examples of a general scaling procedure, modulus estimation, that is proposed as a tool for assessing utility
based on equivalence matching with
previously psychophysically scaled
material. Galanter’s contribution is,
nevertheless, as much theoretical as
it is oriented toward proposing a general measurement tool, because it
is presented in the context of a general motivational theory of expressive behavior. From a more empirical
standpoint, however, some intriguing
suggestions are made about the application of the modulus estimation tools
to the investigation of how utilities of
individual components of a decision
path are combined or integrated to
determine overall utility of that path.
The next chapter, by Melara, is an
extremely well-presented discourse
on a central concept of perceptual
and cognitive structure—similarity.
Many widely used scaling and measurement procedures for assessing either perceptual or representational
structures make implicit assumptions
about similarity, such as its relationship to performance and the metric by
which stimulus differences along separate dimensions are integrated to produce psychological distances among
stimuli or concepts. Melara provides a
concise, thoughtful, and readable historical analysis of how similarity has
been treated historically, moving from
Fechnerian psychophysics through the
contributions of Thurstone, Attneave,
Torgerson, Shepard, Kruskal, and others. This historical analysis leads to the
presentation of a personal view about
the concept of similarity that sets forth
a presumably testable (but as yet not
rigorously tested) model concerning
integration of stimulus dimensions.
The speculative theme with which the
chapter concludes is to its credit; it
should stimulate new thinking and research on a very fundamental issue in
perception and cognition.
Baird and Hubbard address the
topic of mental imagery and the ex-

tent to which psychophysical assessments traditionally applied in the perceptual domain (to actual observed
stimuli) can be applied to assessment
of the structure of imagined stimuli or
events. Both the Baird and Hubbard
chapter and the following chapter by
Algom, titled “Memory Psychophysics,” recognize that, although the study
of memory and imagery have evolved
from research traditions somewhat isolated from that of sensory psychophysics and have thus developed different
approaches and tools to make inferences about mental structure, each discipline can clearly benefit from the
sharing of research tools. Such an approach can be particularly useful in
determining the degree of structural
equivalence between perceptual and
remembered (or mentally created) representations of stimuli.
The chapter on pain research by
Rollman provides an interesting overview of how an extremely important
quality of human experience (but one
that is exceedingly difficult to measure or even define in a noncircular manner) can be systematically explored by psychophysical methods.
Pain is both experienced and remembered and is controlled by both sensory and contextual events. Rollman
provides an excellent layout of issues
concerning the separation of sensory
versus cognitive and emotional components providing many useful illustrations of the confounds and ambiguities inherent in previous laboratory
work on this topic. Despite the shortcomings of much of this reviewed research, Rollman concludes with the
strong view that in assessment of pain
for either clinical, diagnostic, or research purposes, behavioral (i.e., psychophysical) responses encompassing
“numbers, words, and matches” (p.
564) constitute a superior approach to
that provided by purely physiological
measures.
The final chapter of the volume by
Gescheider, Bolanowski, and Verillo
is more focused on methodological issues inherent in measuring sensory
magnitude than on the interface with
more cognitive issues. Although Norman, Marks, and Ward, each in their
own way, stress the unavoidable and
perhaps inseparable cognitive component to sensory measurement, this fi-
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nal chapter returns to the perspective
that measuring sensory magnitude per
se is of value and that, given appropriate measurement procedures, it can be
adequately accomplished with a minimum of contextual biases that could
cause comparisons between experiments and settings to be uninterpretable. In my view, it would have been
better to place this chapter after those
of Marks and Ward, because it does
address the general issue of context effects. As currently placed, however,
this chapter is somewhat difficult to
integrate with the themes of the immediately preceding chapters.
Other than the minor chapter placement issue mentioned above, my only
other criticism is to question whether
the volume title adequately encompasses the breadth of the contents. As
indicated earlier, the initial chapters of
the volume are deeply concerned with
the fact that psychophysical judgment
is by nature a cognitive task—even
when applied to sensory evaluation.
The application of cognitive principles
to produce a better understanding of
sensory judgment, as well to improve
psychophysical measurement techniques, is such an important theme
in several chapters that it would have
been nice to have it reflected in the volume title.
In summary, I believe this volume
will stimulate new research ideas, provide readers with some unique historical and philosophical perspectives, and
raise important basic theoretical issues
about both measurement and cognitive structure. Additionally, several of
the chapters provide useful topical reviews (e.g., Baird and Hubbard on imagery, Algom on memory psychophysics, and Rollman on pain). The volume
makes a compelling case that cognitive
effects are an important component of
psychophysical judgment even within
the sensory realm and that psychophysical techniques can and should be
used to tell us more about aspects of
cognition. Whether the latter message
will be heard by those cognitive psychologists who, according to Algom,
view sensory psychology as “the last
bastion of fixed mechanistic (i.e., psychologically trivial) properties, best left
to those unprepared or uninterested
enough to deal with real psychology”
(p. 10), remains to be seen.

